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Two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary 
policy. First, central bankers may accommodate political pressures to ward off political 
threats to the status ,  the structure, or the very existence of the central bank. Second, 
politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure that central bank appointees 
share their electoral and party-political goals .  This paper derives the monetary policy 
outcomes obtained as a function of the degree of central bank independence (zero, partial, 
or full) and of central bankers ' types (partisans or technocrats) . 
Based on a case study of the 1 957 and 1 992 institutional changes to the German 
central banking system and a regression analysis covering the 1 960- 1 989 period, I argue 
that the formal autonomy of the system is protected by its embeddedness in the institutions 
of German federalism and by the federalist components of its decentralized organizational 
structure. I conclude that the behavioral autonomy of the German central bank fluctuates 
over time with the party control of federalist veto points . The evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the Bundesbank is staffed with non-partisan technocrats who are 
partially insulated from political pressures. 
Federalism and Central Bank Autonomy: 
The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 
1957-1992 
Susanne Lohmann* 
1 Institutions of German Federalism and Central Banking 
The Deutsche Bundesbank is celebrated as one of the most independent central banks 
in the world (Cukierman 1 992) . The Bundesbank Law of 1 957 stipulates that the Bank is 
independent from instructions of the federal government. At first blush, it is surprising that 
German politicians, who devised this law, would deliberately abdicate power to a central 
banking institution. After all, monetary policy has huge allocative and distributional effects on 
the wealth and well-being of political constituencies .  
One motivation for central bank independence is that an independent central bank is 
less likely to respond to counterproductive political pressures.  According to the electoral 
politics hypothesis, incumbent policymakers have incentives to expand the money supply 
prior to elections to stimulate employment and output and thereby increase their chances of re­
election (Nordhaus 1 975 ;  Rogoff and Sibert 1 988) .  The party politics hypothesis proposes 
that one political party caters to a constituency with preferences for low inflation, while its 
competitor represents a constituency that is better off with a high rate of inflation. As a result, 
monetary growth, inflation, employment, and output vary over time as a function of the party 
in power (Hibbs 1 977 ; Alesina 1 987 ; Chappell and Keech 1 986) .  In each case, the political 
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incentives to use monetary instruments for electoral or party-political gain lead to monetary 
variability that could be reduced or even eliminated if central bankers were insulated from 
political pressures.  
The independent status of the Bundesbank can be thought of as an institutional 
solution to the distortions created by the political vulnerability of monetary policy. It is widely 
thought that the formal autonomy of the German central banking system is protected by the 
German people ' s  aversion to inflation, fed by their historical experience with hyperinflation. 
German political culture--specifically the widespread distrust of politicians and political 
parties--is also invoked to explain why changes to the Bundesbank' s independent status are 
taboo in German political discourse (Caesar 1 98 1 ) .  
If the formal autonomy of  the Bundesbank has meaningful implications for its 
behavioral independence, political influences on monetary policy should be less pronounced 
or even non-existent in Germany. Empirical studies of German monetary policy come to 
mixed conclusions. Some scholars provide evidence that German monetary policy is subject to 
electoral or party-political influences, while others reject one or the other hypothesis ( e . g . ,  
Frey and Schneider 1 98 1 ;  Alesina and Roubini 1 992; Lang and Welzel 1 992; Loynd and 
Alvarez 1 992; Eschweiler and Bordo 1 994; Johnson and Siklos 1 994) . 
I argue that empirical studies of political influences on German monetary policy yield 
inconclusive results for two reasons . First, they lack sufficient appreciation of important 
institutional features of the German central banking system and second, they fail to control for 
political factors that affect the degree of (behavioral) central bank independence over time. 
By and large, scholars of German monetary policy base their empirical work on the 
assumption that the federal government controls the money supply . In other words , the 
government is assumed to have not only the incentives but also the ability to manipulate 
monetary instruments in pursuit of electoral or party-political goals. There are, however, good 
reasons why it is inappropriate to model the government and the Deutsche Bundesbank as a 
unitary actor. 
The Bundesbank is granted some degree of formal independence, as noted above. 
Clearly, the degree of central bank autonomy would be irrelevant for the conduct of monetary 
policy if the Bundesbank were populated with perfect agents of the federal government who 
share the electoral or party-political goals of their political principal . Central bank 
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independence matters only if the monetary policy preferences of the Bundesbank differ from 
those of the government. 
In fact, the federal government only appoints a minority of the members of the 
Bundesbank Council, which makes monetary policy decisions by simple majority rule. The 
organizational structure of the Bundesbank is partially decentralized, consisting of a central 
headquarters and a system of Land Central Banks (regional central banks) .  The presidents of 
the Land Central Banks are chosen by the Land (regional state) governments and form a 
majority of the central bank council ; the members of the Directorate are selected by the federal 
government and form a minority.1 
Federal and Land elections are staggered so that the electoral incentives of federal and 
Land appointees do not necessarily coincide. Moreover, one empirical regularity in German 
elections is that the major opposition party at the federal level regularly gains votes in Land 
elections .  As a consequence, the federal government often faces an opposition in the Lander, 
and the timing and outcomes of federal elections do not correlate well with changes in the 
party control of the Bundesbank Council (see Figure 1 ). In this setting, the appointment 
powers of the federal government are insufficient to guarantee its control of the money supply. 
If central bank appointees share the electoral or party-political goals of their respective political 
principals, then monetary policy outcomes will arguably depend on the majority control of the 
central bank council rather than the party control of the federal government. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Indeed, the relationship between the federal government and the Bundesbank is often 
tension-filled--especially when the latter is controlled by the party that forms the opposition at 
the federal level . When a government coalition of Christian Union Parties (CDU/CSU) and the 
Free Democrats formed in 1 982,  former Social-Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
blamed the fall of his Social-Liberal coalition government on the excessively restrictive 
monetary policy of the early eighties (Kennedy 199 1 ,  ch. 3) .  His accusations were echoed in a 
radio commentary: 
1 Formally, the President of the Republic appoints all members of the Bundesbank Council. The Land Central 
Bank presidents are de jure nominated by the Bundesrat but de facto selected by their respective Land 
governments; the members of the Directorate are nominated by the federal government. 
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In the last years of his chancellorship, Schmidt must have experienced the 
policy of scarce and expensive money as an interest rate bondage . . . . For 
several years , Schmidt had suspected the strongly federalist central bank 
council of following a policy of fighting inflation because a majority of Land 
Central Bank presidents represented CDU/CSU-governed Lander. 
(Balkhausen 1 992, 1 39- 140) 
Over a decade later, history reversed itself. For a number of years , the Bundesbank 
had followed an extremely restrictive monetary policy to cope with the inflationary pressures 
created by German unification. When Schmidt' s  successor, Christian-Democratic (CDU) 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl , was up for re-election in the fall of 1 994, the money supply 
expanded dramatically in the four pre-election quarters . The German news magazine Der 
Spiegel ( 1 994, 1 05) commented suspiciously : 
In fact, the CDU-dominated central bank council appears to have lost control of 
the money supply at a time that is strategically most advantageous for re­
election purposes.  
So far my discussion has been based on the assumption that elected politicians control 
the central bank via their powers of appointment: central bankers are partisans who share the 
electoral or party-political goals of their political principals .  A plausible alternative hypothesis 
holds that the Bundesbank is an excellent example of Schumpeter' s  ( 1 942, 293) "well-trained 
bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no 
less strong esprit de corps ." According to this view, the Bundesbank is staffed with non­
partisan technocrats who are guided by the Bundesbank' s proud ethos of refusing to 
compromise in matters of inflation (Kennedy 1 99 1 ,  8 ) .  Unsurprisingly, this is also the self­
image of Bundesbank representatives .  
Elected politicians may deliberately choose to appoint non-partisan types if they are ex 
ante better off insulating monetary policy from party-political pressures .  Or they may make 
partisan appointments only to see their appointees submit to the Bundesbank' s stifling 
institutional culture. The transformatory power of Bundesbank-internal peer group pressures 
has become widely known as the "Thomas Becket effect" (Marsh 1 992, 33) .  
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If central bankers are non-partisan technocrats , then elected politicians can influence 
monetary policy by threatening the status, the structure, or the existence of the central bank. 
The degree of central bank independence--or, equivalently, the degree to which the 
Bundesbank is impervious to political threats--then determines the extent to which central 
bankers are forced to accommodate electoral or party-political pressures. 
Cross-national studies of central banking in industrialized countries typically focus on 
formal rather than behavioral independence (see Cukierman 1 992 and references therein) .  By 
and large these studies assume implicitly that the degree of agency discretion enjoyed by a 
central bank is invariant over time if the formal status of the central bank does not change. 
While the Bundesbank is certainly granted some degree of political independence, the 
comparison with other central banks tends to obscure the fact that the German central bank is 
not perfectly insulated from the pressures of German politics .  Moreover, while the legal status 
of the Bundesbank remained unchanged from 1 957 to 1 992, informal evidence suggests that 
the behavioral independence of the Bundesbank has :fluctuated considerably during this time 
period (Caesar 1 98 1 ;  Goodman 1 992; Lohmann 1 994a) . It is clearly of interest to identify the 
political factors that might explain such variation over time. 
One factor determining the scope of the Bundesbank' s discretionary powers is given 
by the popularity of the chancellor and his economic policies . If the federal government 
pressures the Bundesbank to accommodate its electoral or party-political demands, the 
Bundesbank can threaten to go public . A public dramatization of the conflict creates political 
costs--but the popularity of the federal government determines whether these costs are 
primarily borne by the government or by the Bundesbank. If popular support for the 
government and its economic policies is already weak, then public resistance on the part of the 
Bundesbank will further undermine the government' s  position. On the other hand, the 
Bundesbank endangers the legitimacy of its independent status if it publicly quarrels with 
popular elected officials .  Thus, the government' s  political capacity to influence monetary 
policy increases with its popularity. 
A second factor determining the degree of central bank independence can be identified 
with reference to the institutions of German federalism and central banking. The Bundesbank 
is more likely to accommodate political pressures if its independent status would otherwise be 
undermined. The Bundesbank Law is a simple federal law, and the government can threaten to 
change the Law with the goal of eliminating the formal independence of the Bundesbank, 
centralizing the B ank's organizational structure, or dissolving the Bundesbank institution 
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altogether. Since Germany is a parliamentary democracy, legislation proposed by the federal 
government is typically supported by a majority in the Bundestag, the first house of 
parliament. 
However, the credibility of a legislative threat is limited by the institutions of German 
federalism. Changes to the Bundesbank Law can be vetoed by the Bundesrat, the second 
house of parliament. The members of the Bundesrat are delegates of the Land governments , 
who have a stake in the Bundesbank institution and thus may resist institutional changes-­
especially changes in the direction of more centralization. The threat of a Bundesrat veto may 
force the federal government to expend political capital and modify its legislative proposals to 
ensure their passage through the Bundesrat. Ultimately the veto powers of the Bundesrat may 
be too weak to prevent central bank legislation from being passed, but they can effectively 
create legislative transaction costs and hurdles, thereby delaying legislation for many months 
or even years . At the very least, the Bundesrat veto has the potential to prevent the passage of 
legislation driven by very short-run political interests . 
Given the prominent role of party discipline in German politics, such legislative 
obstruction is less likely under unified party control of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. This 
situation arises when the parties that form the federal government also control a large number 
of Land governments . The federal government can then threaten to undermine the 
Bundesbank' s independent status with some degree of credibility. On the other hand, a 
government that faces a partisan opposition in the Lander and in the Bundesrat is in a weak 
position to force the Bundesbank to do its bidding. The Bank thus enjoys a greater amount of 
agency discretion under divided party control, while it is forced to accommodate political 
pressures to a greater extent under unified party control .  It follows that the impact of political 
pressures on monetary policy will depend on the party control of the federal and Land 
governments, as well as the two houses of parliament. 
Moreover, I conceive of central bank independence as a continuous variable rather than 
a dichotomous one: the weaker the partisan support for the federal government in the 
Bundesrat, the more time, effort, and political capital must be spent by the federal government 
to ensure the passage of its legislative proposals through the Bundesrat, and the more the 
government must compromise and modify its proposals. 
Building on a case study of institutional change that demonstrates the impact of the 
Bundesrat veto point and its partisan control,  the regression analysis conducted in this article 
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will take into account a variety of political factors that shape German monetary policy. Thus,  
my empirical analysis has the potential to provide more conclusive evidence for (or against) 
the notion that German monetary policy is influenced by electoral and party-political 
considerations .  
The analysis also sheds light on the optimal design of central banking institutions .  
Even if the members of the central bank council are political appointees who share the electoral 
and party-political goals of their political principals, political pressures may be muted if the 
central banking institution is appropriately designed and deeply embedded in the institutions of 
federalism. With its emphasis on institutional design rather than formal independence, the 
analysis complements preference-based theories of central banking that prescribe the 
delegation of monetary policy authority to an independent central bank staffed with 
conservative types , captured by inflation-averse private banking interests , or dominated by a 
technocratic corporate culture (Rogoff 1 985;  Lohmann 1 992, 1 994a; Posen 1 993;  Maxfield 
1 994a) . 
Countering the "institutions don't  matter" view articulated by Posen ( 1 993), I argue 
that monetary institutions have an independent policy impact and are not simply 
epiphenomena! to the underlying political interests . The institutional membrane that maps 
monetary policy preferences into outcomes is, of course,  at some point in time the object of 
political choice. In this sense, monetary institutions are shaped by the policy preferences of the 
relevant political actors at the "institutional design stage" (Lohmann 1 992) . Once a central 
banking institution is set up, however, any changes to the institution are difficult or costly due 
to the presence of "political veto players" (Tsebelis 1 995) . Indeed, a central point of my 
analysis is that elected politicians deliberately set up veto points in order to insulate monetary 
policy from counterproductive political pressures .  The "stickiness" of institutional 
arrangements implies that the relevant political actors , their preferences, or other factors 
determining their relative power may change while the institution remains constant. In the case 
under consideration, the federal components of the Bundesbank institution are designed to 
give the Lander a stake in the institution, thereby turning the Bundesrat into an important veto 
player; however, the impact of this veto point varies over time as a function of divided versus 
unified party control of the federal and regional state governments .  
My analysis i s  related to  the New Institutionalism developed by Mccubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast ( 1 987) . According to this approach, elected politicians may delegate power to 




political control of the bureaucracy. In the United States, such delegation regimes may be 
shaped by divided versus unified party control of the presidency and Congress .  My article 
analyzes the political control of a specific agency (the central bank) in a parliamentary system 
characterized by strong party discipline and separation of powers between federal and regional 
state governments . 
There is an important distinction between the logic underlying the political control of 
the bureaucracy in general and of central banks in particular. The New Institutionalism asserts 
that political principals have ex ante incentives to structure the environment of political 
agencies with the objective of preventing the bureaucracy from developing discretionary 
powers, thereby ensuring its ex post political responsiveness.  In contrast, elected politicians 
have ex ante incentives to depoliticize monetary policy decisions by (at least partially) 
insulating central bankers from ex post political pressures. One reason is that rational inflation 
expectations undermine the potential of monetary policy to produce systematic real effects on 
the economy that might further the electoral fortunes of incumbent politicians . Another reason 
is that politicians anticipate that they might be in the opposition in the future. As a result, they 
may be better off ex ante ensuring that monetary policy is not vulnerable to political pressures 
of any kind. 
Finally, my analysis builds on the scholarly analysis of the Federal Reserve System 
(e .g . ,  Beck 1 982; Woolley 1 984; Grier 1 99 1 ;  Chappell , Havrilesky, and MacGregor 1993 ; 
Havrilesky 1 995) .  In the United States, monetary policy decisions are made by the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) . Its voting membership consists of seven governors and 
five (of twelve) regional district bank presidents .  The governors are political appointees : they 
are chosen by the president subject to Senate confirmation. The appointment of bank 
presidents , each of whom is nominated by his or her district bank board of directors , is 
subject to private sector--and, in particular, financial sector--influences. Thus, a majority of 
the committee is "controlled" by the federal government, a minority by regional interests ; 
"political appointees" form a majority on the FOMC, "banker appointees" a minority. The 
district bank presidents tend to prefer more restrictive monetary policies than do the 
governors . Presidential and Congressional powers of appointment and influence appear to 
create a bias toward expansionary monetary policies, which is muted by private sector 
influences on regional district bank appointments . The inflationary or deflationary contribution 
of central government versus regional district appointments , on the one hand, and political 
versus private sector appointments , on the other, is easily confounded. 
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In comparison, the Bundesbank Council consists only of political appointees, and 
regional state representatives can outvote federal government appointees .  The analysis of the 
German case has the potential to disentangle the role played by partially decentralized 
appointment powers relative to other political factors . 
The political systems of the United States and Germany differ in another important 
respect, which makes intellectual arbitrage difficult. The U.S . system is relatively more 
transparent. As a consequence, scholars can use publicly available data to measure the 
monetary policy preferences of central bank appointees and the severity of government-central 
bank conflict. Examples of such data are dissenting votes cast in FOMC meetings or the 
number of newspaper articles in which elected politicians and government officials complain 
about the direction of monetary policy. 
In comparison, data about voting behavior on the Bundesbank Council is not publicly 
available. As a result, the link between political appointment powers and central bank 
accommodation can only be tested indirectly. Moreover, the government rarely pressures the 
Bundesbank in a publicly visible way, and only the most serious conflicts between the federal 
government and the central bank are carried out in public. To the extent that political pressures 
and government-central bank conflict are invisible to the scholar' s eye, hypotheses about 
political influences on German monetary policy must rely on indirect measures . The use of 
indirect, and possible very crude, measures has the potential to weaken the positive and 
normative conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis . For this reason, it is all the more 
important to provide a careful motivation for the measures used. This is the purpose of the 
case study, which supplements the regression analysis . Before I tum to the empirical 
evidence, however, I present the theory that is to be tested. 
2 A Theory of Delegation and Accommodation 
The electoral and party political theories developed by Nordhaus, Hibbs, and other 
scholars are modified in two ways to allow for their application to the institutions of German 
central banking and federalism: I examine the role of central bank independence and of 
partially decentralized appointment powers . My analysis thus allows for two channels by 
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which elected politicians can influence monetary policy: political pressure and the power of 
appointment. 
The degree of central bank independence may vary continuously between zero and full 
independence. Furthermore, political appointees may be partisans or technocrats . In 
accordance with the two theories developed by Nordhaus and Hibbs,  political appointees may 
be partisan in two ways :  they may have a stake in the re-election chances of the federal 
government; or they may follow an expansionary or restrictive monetary policy depending on 
the inflation preferences of their party' s  constituency. 
My theory is "general" in the sense that it encompasses the hypotheses proposed by 
Nordhaus, Hibbs,  and other scholars as special cases that are obtained for some combination 
of assumptions about the degree of central bank independence (zero, full, or partial) and 
central bankers ' types (partisans or technocrats) . These two factors define the relationship 
between monetary growth and the timing of federal elections, as well as monetary growth and 
the partisan control of the federal government or the central bank council (see Table 1 and 
Figures 2 and 3) .  
[TABLE 1 AND FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Zero Independence and Partisans or Technocrats (H 1 ) .  Nordhaus' electoral politics 
hypothesis assumes that the government controls the money supply ; the same holds for 
Hibbs '  party politics hypothesis .2 In other words , their hypotheses obtain if the degree of 
central bank independence is zero, in which case central bankers ' types--partisans or 
technocrats--are irrelevant: 
H 1 (Zero Independence and Partisans or Technocrats) 
• Monetary growth rates are higher prior to federal elections. 
• Monetary growth rates are lower (higher) if the federal government 1s 
controlled by a right-of-center (left-of-center) party. 
2 Rogoff and Sibert (1988) formulate the Nordhaus hypothesis in a rational inflation expectations framework; 
Alesina (1987) and Chappell and Keech (1986) do the same for the Hibbs hypothesis. The implications for 
monetary growth rates are robust. 
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Full Independence and Partisans (H2) .  Next, I consider the case in which monetary 
policy is set by simple majority rule in a central bank council composed of a minority of 
federal government appointees and a majority of regional state appointees, all of whom share 
the electoral or party-political goals of their respective political principals. 
Nordhaus'  electoral politics hypothesis is replaced by Vaubel' s  ( 1 993) obstructionist 
hypothesis .3 Suppose that both federal and regional policymakers prefer to have their party 
control the federal government. Then their central bank appointees manipulate the money 
supply prior to federal elections. However, the sign of the pre-election monetary stimulus 
depends on whether the party that is incumbent at the federal level controls the central bank 
council. If so, then monetary growth will be higher in pre-election periods--as before . On the 
other hand, if the federal government faces a partisan opposition on the council, then monetary 
growth will be lower in pre-election periods : the opposition-controlled central bank will 
attempt to thwart the re-election chances of the incumbent party by following a restrictive 
monetary policy prior to the election. 
Hibbs ' party politics hypothesis is replaced by a median voter hypothesis : whether 
monetary growth is expansionary or restrictive is determined by the party affiliation of the 
median voter on the central bank council. 4 
The obstructionist and median voter hypotheses hold if the central bank is controlled 
by fully independent partisans : 
H2 (Full Independence and Partisans) 
• Monetary growth rates are higher (lower) prior to federal elections if the 
federal government is supported (opposed) by a partisan majority on the central 
bank council. 
• Monetary growth rates are lower (higher) if the median voter on the central 
bank council was appointed by a right-of-center (left-of-center) party. 
3 Lohmann ( l 994b) formalizes the obstructionist hypothesis in a rational expectations framework. 
4 Lohmann (1994c) formalizes the median voter hypothesis in a rational expectations framework. 
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Full Independence and Technocrats (H0) .  Maintaining the assumption that the central 
bank is fully independent, I now consider the possibility that central bankers are technocrats . 
If so, monetary growth is not subject to electoral or party-political influences .  For obvious 
reasons, this special case of my model--the central bank as benevolent dictator--serves as the 
null hypothesis : 
H0 (Full Independence and Technocrats) 
Monetary growth rates are free of electoral or party-political effects . 
Partial Independence and Partisans (H3) .  If central bankers are partially independent 
partisans , then the sign and size of the pre-election monetary stimulus depend on the party 
control of the federal government and of the Bundesbank, as well as the degree of central bank 
independence; the same factors determine the degree to which monetary growth is 
expansionary or restrictive for party-political reasons : 
H3 (Partial Independence and Partisans) 
• Monetary growth rates are set as a linear combination of the partisan 
monetary growth rates desired by the federal government and by the median 
voter on the central bank council, where the relative weight on the monetary 
growth rate preferred by the federal government decreases with the degree of 
central bank independence. 
Partial Independence and Technocrats (H4) .  If, instead, central bankers are partially 
independent technocrats , then electoral and party-political effects are increasingly muted as the 
degree of central bank independence rises :  
H4 (Partial Independence and Technocrats) 
• Monetary growth rates are set as a linear combination of the partisan 
monetary growth rate desired by the federal government and the non-partisan 
monetary growth rate desired by central bank technocrats, where the relative 
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weight on the monetary growth rate preferred by the federal government 
decreases with the degree of central bank independence. 
3 A Case Study of Institutional Change 
The political impact of the Bundesrat veto point and of its partisan control are now 
illustrated with a case study of the 1 957 replacement of the Bank deutscher Lander by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and the 1 992 modification of the Bundesbank institution necessitated 
by German unification. [Lohmann ( 1 994a) provides further details and documentation. ]  The 
case study serves two purposes . First, it motivates four measures of central bank 
independence that are utilized in the regression analysis . Second, it provides qualitative 
evidence complementing the quantitative results of the regression analysis. 
After the Second World War, the military occupation forces in West Germany set up a 
decentralized system of Land Central Banks coordinated by their joint subsidiary, the Bank 
deuscher Lander in Frankfurt. The decision-making body of the system was composed of the 
presidents of the Land Central Banks and two further members of their choice, the president 
of the central bank council and the president of the Directorate. The Bank deutscher Lander 
was formally independent of the federal government. 
The 1 949 Constitution provided a mandate to replace military law with German law 
and establish a central bank. The political debate about the institutional design of the central 
banking system began soon thereafter and continued through two legislative periods : 
no one directly called the independence of the future central bank into question . 
. . . At issue, instead, was the degree of centralization in the new banking 
system . . . .  the vehemence of the debate throughout West German political and 
social life indicated that significant interests were . . .  at stake. (Goodman 
1 99 1 ,  337) 
The federal government initially favored a decentralized central banking system in 
which a majority of the members of the central bank council would be selected by the Land 
governments . However, when the Bank deutscher Lander followed a very restrictive 
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monetary policy in 1 955  and 1 956,  Chancellor Konrad Adenauer became unhappy with its 
perceived failure to support economic reconstruction. Questioning the legitimacy of the Bank' s 
independence, the federal government subsequently developed legislation to implement a more 
centralized central banking system, in which the federal government would gain majority 
control of the central bank council via its appointment powers . The government' s  legislative 
proposal was supported by a majority in the Bundestag, but the Bundesrat expressed a 
preference for a decentralized system consistent with the "one Land, one Land Central Bank" 
principle . 
Numerous proposals and counterproposals ended with a compromise. The 
Bundesbank Law was passed by both houses of parliament in July 1 957.  The Bundestag vote 
was unanimous .  In the Bundesrat, only two Lander voted against the Law, and there is no 
obvious partisan pattern in the vote . Up to the end, there was considerable disagreement 
regarding the question whether the Law was zustimmungspflichtig (required the approval of 
the Bundesrat) . This issue remained unresolved when the compromise bill was passed by a 
two-thirds majority of the Bundesrat. 
The highly decentralized and independent Bank deutscher Lander was thus replaced by 
a partially decentralized and partially independent central banking institution. Until the Law 
was modified in 1 992, the council consisted of de jure up to ten and de facto between six and 
nine federal government appointees (the members of the Directorate) and eleven regional state 
appointees (the Land Central Bank presidents) . Moreover, the formal autonomy of the 
Bundesbank is limited. The Law stipulates that the Bank is independent of instructions from 
the federal government in following its mandated goal of safeguarding the currency, but the 
Bundesbank is also required to support the general economic policy of the federal 
government. The Law is ambiguous ;  the formulators of the Bundesbank Law deliberately 
chose not to specify how a potential conflict between the goal of safeguarding the currency 
and competing policy objectives of the government should be resolved. In their view , the 
public dramatization of conflicts between the government and the central bank was desirable, 
with the public (represented by political parties and the media) serving as an umpire. The 
outcome of such a conflict would then depend on the relative trust placed by the public in its 
elected representatives and in the appointed defenders of the currency. 
In the following decades, in fact, both the federal government and the Bundesbank 
would enter into a public conflict only when the stakes were high, given the considerable 
political costs associated with such a conflict. The government is aware that a public conflict 
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can threaten its stability--especially if the popularity of the chancellor and his economic 
policies is ailing; in three cases, the Bundesbank is said to have directly or indirectly 
contributed to the resignation of a chancellor or to the collapse of a coalition government 
(Marsh 1 992, 225) .  On the other hand, the Bundesbank knows that it can endanger the 
legitimacy of its independent status if it publicly quarrels with popular elected officials ; in one 
case its resistance to the popular policies of a chancellor ended with the resignation of the 
Bundesbank president (Marsh 1 992, Ch. VIII) . Even if a conflict is not actually fought out in 
public , the political costs incurred in the event of a public confrontation have an impact on 
monetary policy: they determine the degree to which the Bundesbank must accommodate 
political pressures in order to avoid a public debate. 
The above discussion suggests that the formal autonomy of the Bundesbank can be 
classified as partial only. Moreover, the Bundesbank' s legal independence is complemented 
by the federalist components of its organizational structure . In the debate leading up to the 
passage of the Bundesbank Law, described in Deutsche Bundesbank ( 1 988) ,  the decentralized 
structure of the central bank was celebrated as an institutional guarantee of its independence. 
Similarly, the pluralism of the appointing bodies and the participation of the Lander in the 
appointment process was thought to contribute to the Bank' s autonomy. Central bankers who 
are not subject to a unified political will were said to be more independent. 
The principle of central bank independence vis-a-vis the federal government was 
deemed crucial for the safeguarding of the currency: this principle would be institutionally 
guaranteed by the federalist components of the central bank' s internal organizational structure, 
which create legislative hurdles making future amendments to the Bundesbank Law difficult 
and time-consuming. Indeed, the Law of 1 957 was said to be characterized by the "stamp of 
compromise" due to the "retarding influence of the Lander" (Konneker 1 957,  796) . In the 
course of the debate, the value of the "one Land, one Land Central Bank" principle became 
apparent. A strong link between the federal structure of the Lander and the structure of the 
Bundesbank was associated with a high likelihood that the Lander would resist any attempts 
of the federal government to change the Bundesbank Law or force the Bundesbank to do its 
bidding.  
Several decades later, another political debate on the design of the German central 
banking system occurred after German unification was completed on October 3 ,  1 990. The 
unification treaty of August 1 990 required the Bundesbank Law to be modified within one 
year of unification, by October 3 ,  1 99 1 ,  with the objective of integrating the new East German 
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Lander into the Bundesbank system. However, due to the fierce dispute between the federal 
and Land governments about the organizational form of the new central banking system, the 
deadline was not met: it took two years to modify the Bundesbank Law. As before, the central 
issue was the degree of centralization of the central banking system: 
German political elites, particularly in the ruling Christian Democrat-Free 
Democrat coalition and members of the Bundesbank Directorate . . . used the 
events of German unification and the discussions over European monetary 
integration as strategic rationalizations to hone the Bundesbank into a more 
centralized and less federal structure, a structure which will be . . . less 
dominated by [the presidents of the Land Central B anks] . (Kaltenthaler 1 993 , 
2-3) 
The federal government sought to increase the relative number of federal appointees on 
the Bundesbank Council by consolidating the Land Central Bank system. The government' s  
bill was rejected by a two-thirds majority of the Bundesrat that instead supported a proposal 
embodying the "one Land, one Land Central Bank" principle while maintaining the maximum 
size of the Directorate prescribed in the Bundesbank Law of 1 957 .  Since the number of 
Lander had increased after German unification, this proposal amounted to a strengthening of 
the Land component on the central bank council. 
The Bundestag passed the legislative proposal of the federal government by simple 
majority, largely along party lines with some abstentions . An overwhelming majority of the 
Bundesrat subsequently rejected that proposal and initiated the formal conciliation procedure. 
This majority contained the oppositional Social Democrats, who controlled a simple majority 
of the Bundesrat, as well as some Christian-Democratic Land governments . The latter were 
torn between representing the interests of their Lander, on the one hand, and supporting the 
proposal of the federal government, on the other. 
The compromise proposal of the conciliation committee was subsequently rejected by a 
simple majority of the Bundesrat, which also declared the Bundesbank Law to be 
zustimmungspflichtig. The vote followed party lines, with the Social Democrats voting against 
the federal government' s  proposal .  The initially close-to-united front of Lander had broken up: 
some Land representatives in the Bundesrat who had initially voted in favor of the Bundesrat' s 
decentralized proposal had switched their support to the federal government' s  bill . To 
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undermine the opposition and convince wavering Christian Democrats in the Bundesrat, the 
federal government had modified its proposal .  Indeed, it was not a coincidence that three 
states governed by the Social Democrats and only one Christian-Democratic state were forced 
to give up their Land Central B anks . The federal government only had to modify marginally 
its proposal to convince Christian Democrats to support its bill, whereas it would have been 
more expensive to pay off Social Democrats to vote against their party line. Overall, the 
consolidation and specific location of the Land Central Banks were clearly determined by 
political and not technocratic considerations . 
If a two-thirds majority of the Bundesrat had voted against the proposal of the 
conciliation committee, or if changes to the Bundesbank Law had been classified consensually 
as zustimmungspflichtig, then the Bundestag would have had to counter the Bundesrat veto 
with a two-thirds majority, and the federal government did not have such a majority in the 
Bundestag. Based on the presumption that the bill did not require the approval of the 
Bundesrat, a simple majority of the Bundestag proceeded to pass the changes to the Law .  
Thus, partisan majorities in the two houses o f  parliament disagreed about the legal status of 
the Bundesbank Law. The government of the Rheinland-Palatinate, controlled by the 
oppositional Social Democrats, initially threatened to petition the Supreme Court for a finding 
that the law was zustimmungspflichtig, but it backed off when its Land Central Bank gained 
responsibility for the Saarland. (In 1 96 1 ,  the Court had declared changes to the Bundesbank 
Law not to be zustimmungspflichtig, but the change under consideration was a minor one. 
There was some residual uncertainty about how the Court would decide if approached in 
1 992 . )  
The Fourth Law Modifying the Bundesbank Law thus passed in  June 1 992.  The Law 
allows for nine Land Central Banks and up to eight members of the Directorate. Some Lander 
are represented by their own Land Central Bank, while others share a Land Central B ank. The 
Bundesrat veto point thus ensured that Land appointees continue to form a majority on the 
council; but it failed to prevent a further dilution of the federalist components of the German 
central banking system. First, the number of Land Central Bank presidents has declined 
absolutely, and the ratio of regional state and federal government appointees has decreased 
from an average of 1 1 /8 in the 1 957- 1 992 period to an average of 9/8 in the 1 993- 1 995 
period. Second, the "one Land, one Land Central Bank" principle has been given up . The 
Land governments that share a Land Central Bank must now agree on a compromise candidate 
for the presidency of their Land Central Bank. One consequence of such a consolidated Land 
Central B ank system was illustrated subsequently when the position of Land Central Bank 
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president for the Lander Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 
remained unfilled for a year because the Land governments--two of them controlled by the 
Social Democrats , the other one dominated by the Christian Democrats--could not agree on a 
candidate. 
4 Regression Analysis 
The formal status of the Bundesbank remained constant between 1 957 and 1 992, and 
yet my empirical analysis employs quarterly data covering only the time period 1 960- 1989. 
The data set begins with the year 1 960 for two reasons.  First, the Saarland and West Berlin 
are only included in national income statistics as of 1 960. Second, a fair test of theories 
assigning an important role to political parties can be conducted only for a reasonably stable 
party system. In the 1 950s, the West German party system was still very much in flux. By the 
early sixties, almost all special interest and regional parties had merged with other parties or 
dropped out of federal and regional state parliaments .  The data set ends in 1 989 to avoid 
confounding the monumental political changes associated with German unification in 1 990 
with other factors driving the Bundesbank' s political responsiveness .  
The time period 1 960- 1 989 has the potential to allow for a powerful test of divided 
government effects . It is characterized by several switches in power at the federal level . From 
1 960 to 1 966, the right-of-center Christian Union Parties (CDU/CSU) formed a government 
coalition with the centrist Free Democrats (FDP) ; a grand coalition of CDU/CSU and the left­
of-center Social Democrats (SPD) governed from 1966 to 1 969 ; the SPD held power together 
with the FDP from 1 969 to 1 982, followed by a coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP. Both 
single-party and coalition governments occurred at the Land level . While a handful of Lander 
have been dominated by one party, no party has had a lock on a majority of the Land 
governments during this time period, and the partisan majorities in the Bundesrat have 
changed several times . 
There is one potential drawback to testing the party politics hypothesis on data of this 
time period. A number of factors unrelated to German politics are associated with the world­
wide inflation of the 1 970 ' s and disinflation of the 1 980' s ,  and these factors cannot be fully 
disentangled from the effects of left- and right-of-center party control of the German 
government in the seventies and eighties, respectively . 
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One such factor is given by shifts in the academic (near-)consensus among economists 
regarding the efficacy of Keynesian stabilization policies. The once-dominant doctrine of an 
inflation-unemployment tradeoff has been replaced by the wide-spread view that it is 
inappropriate to use monetary policy instruments to fight unemployment or raise output, as 
well as a new recognition of the importance of price stability for aggregate welfare. The 
current doctrine provides the Bundesbank with an intellectual rationale to fend off political 
pressures for inflation as counterproductive and irresponsible. 
Another factor is given by increasing international interdependencies and--of particular 
importance for monetary policy--financial integration. Maxfield ( 1 994a) argues that the 
competition between countries for scarce capital intensifies with financial integration. To 
attract or reassure global investors and creditors , countries cede authority to central banks or 
reinforce existing authority, with disinflationary consequences. It is worthwhile noting, 
however, that Germany has long been internationally very competitive with regard to the 
independence of its central bank. 
The regression variables are defined in Table 2. The descriptive statistics of the data 
are documented in Table 3 .  The substantive significance of my empirical inquiry is supported 
by some intriguing patterns that appear in the descriptive statistics of German monetary 
growth. On average, the money supply expanded at a rate of 7. 8 % over the time period 1 960-
1 9 89. The average for the four quarters preceding each federal election is 8.2%. Monetary 
growth averages 7. 8% under the Grand Coalition; 8. 1 % in periods of Social-Liberal rule; and 
7. 6% in periods of Christian-Liberal government (see Table 4). Thus, electoral and party­
political influences appear to be present in the raw data. I now conduct an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression analysis to test the monetary policy implications of my theory. 
[TABLES 2, 3 ,  AND 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Full Independence and Technocrats (H0). I first develop and test a base economic 
model that also serves as the null ("benevolent dictator") hypothesis H0 according to which 
German monetary policy is free of electoral and party-political influences. 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of the seasonally adjusted central bank 
money stock. (All growth rates are calculated as fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter percentage 
growth rates. ) The choice of monetary variable is guided by the fact that the Bundesbank 
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targeted the central bank money stock from 1 975 to 1 987--from 1 988 onwards , it targeted the 
monetary aggregate M3 . As explained further below, I control for changes in the 
Bundesbank' s reaction function across two regimes, the 1 960- 1 974 period when the 
Bundesbank did not publicly commit itself to a monetary target and the 1 975- 1 989 monetary 
targeting regime. The Bundesbank missed its targets seven out of fifteen times in the 1 975-
1 989 period, suggesting that the monetary policy constraints implied by the targets were weak 
at best. For this reason, I do not control for the size of the targets . 
Since the German economy is highly integrated into the world economy, the 
Bundesbank is concerned not only about output growth and inflation, but also about external 
balance. I thus include the following independent variables in my regression equation: the one­
quarter lagged growth rate of gross national product (GNP) ; the one-quarter lagged inflation 
rate of the consumer price index; and the one-quarter lagged U . S .  Dollar-Deutschmark 
exchange rate. 5 
To capture the constraints on monetary policy implied by Germany' s  participation in 
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, I include a Bretton Woods dummy variable 
that takes on the value one in the time period 1960/ 1 - 1 973/ 1 and the value zero otherwise. I 
allow for the possibility that the Bretton Woods regime constrains the Bundesbank' s  response 
to real and nominal variables by including as independent variables the product of the Bretton 
Woods dummy variable, on the one hand, and each of the economic controls (rates of GNP 
growth, inflation, and exchange rate depreciation) on the other. All of the Bretton Woods 
variables serve another function, namely to control (approximately) for the possibility of a 
change in the monetary policy reaction function when the Bundesbank switched to a monetary 
targeting regime in December 1 974. 
Germany' s  subsequent membership in another fixed exchange rate system, the 
European Monetary System (EMS), is reflected in a second dummy variable that takes on the 
value one in the time period 1 979/2- 1 989/4 and the value zero otherwise. I allow for the 
possibility that the EMS constrains the Bundesbank' s response to real and nominal variables 
by including as independent variables the product of the EMS dummy variable, on the one 
hand, and each of the economic controls (rates of GNP growth, inflation, and exchange rate 
devaluation) on the other. 
5 GNP is the standard measure of "output" in German national income statistics; many other countries 
(including the United States) use gross domestic product instead. The Dollar-Deutschmark exchange rate is 
chosen because a significant amount of world trade is invoiced in Dollars, and because the Dollar and the 
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The period not covered by the Bretton Woods and EMS dummy variables, 1 973/2-
1 979/ 1 ,  corresponds (approximately) to the period in which some member states of the 
European Community fixed exchange rate parities within pre-specified margins of fluctuation. 
Thus, the Bretton Woods and EMS dummy variables, both in their simple and multiplicative 
form, indirectly control for the monetary policy effects of this exchange rate regime, the 
"Snake (in the Tunnel) . "  The exchange rate regime dummy variables also serve as indirect 
controls for the potentially inflationary effects of the oil price shocks that impinged on the 
German economy in the mid- 1 970 ' s .  
Preliminary regression results indicate persistence in the monetary growth rate over 
time. Following Lang and Welzel ( 1 992) , I add the one-period lagged monetary growth rate as 
a dependent variable. The presence of a lagged dependent variable implies that one of the 
assumptions underlying standard OLS regression analysis is violated, namely that the right­
hand-side variables are independent of the disturbance term. As a consequence, the OLS 
estimators are biased. While the lagged dependent variable is correlated with past 
disturbances, it is contemporaneously independent of the disturbance term so that the OLS 
estimators are consistent. In a panel or cross-sectional study characterized by a low number of 
observations per unit of analysis, the bias may be unacceptably large. However, my time­
series analysis is based on 1 1 5 observations .6 The bias is consequently very small and does 
not affect the qualitative results of the analysis .7 
Another problem associated with the presence of a lagged endogeneous variable is that 
the Durbin-Watson statistic may be biased. I deal with this problem by reporting the Durbin h 
statistic. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Deutschmark are close substitutes in their role as international reserve currencies. 
6 I use 1 15 and not 120 observations, as might be expected for quarterly data covering the time period 1960-
1989. This is due to the loss of the first five observations that arises when lagged fourth-quarter-to-fourth­
quarter growth rates are formed. 
7 See Kennedy (1985, 122). Consider the model Yt = a +  f3Yt-l + ep where y is the dependent variable, f3 is the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, and e is a spherical disturbance. The bias of the OLS estimator of 
{3, 130LS, is given by - ( 1 +3{3)/T, where T is the number of observations . Note that the bias becomes small as T 
becomes large. (Moreover, the presence of additional regressors in the model decreases the bias.) One possible 
correction for the bias is to use the estimator (T{3°LS+J)/(T-3) . An inspection of the regression results 
summarized in Tables 5 and 6 shows that my qualitative conclusions are unaffected by the bias, given that T 
equals 1 15 in my analysis. 
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The regression results for the base economic model are reported in Table 5 .  The 
constant and lagged monetary growth have significant explanatory power at the 1 % level . The 
coefficients on the Bretton Woods and EMS dummy variables are negative in sign and are 
significant at the 1 % and 5 %  levels,  respectively. This result is consistent with our prior 
knowledge about the inflationary accommodation of the oil price shocks in the mid- 1970 ' s  
(the period not covered b y  the Bretton Woods and EMS dummy variables) . 
The coefficients on other economic controls--the rates of GNP growth, inflation, and 
exchange rate depreciation, both in their simple and multiplicative form--exhibit a more 
complex pattern of signs and levels of significance. The Bundesbank is primarily responsive 
to inflation. This result is consistent with the widespread view that the Bank pursues its price 
stabilization goal in a single-minded way. Under the Bretton Woods regime, the coefficient on 
the inflation rate is positive and significant at the 1 % level . In the post Bretton Woods period, 
inflationary pressures are met with a contraction in monetary growth; this effect is also 
significant at the 1 % level. The EMS does not have an independent effect on inflation. These 
results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that the Bretton Woods regime 
significantly compromised the Bundesbank's pursuit of its price stabilization goal . The 
European Snake is thought to have imposed little if any constraint on the conduct of Germany 
monetary policy. The insignificant impact of the EMS is consistent with the commonly held 
view that the Deutschmark is (de facto, if not de jure) the anchor currency of the system. 
Turning to the analysis of the political hypotheses , I find high levels of 
multicollinearity (and unsurprisingly so: see Figures 2 and 3 ) .  For this reason, I run a 
sequence of non-nested regressions, each of which tests one hypothesis about the degree of 
central bank independence and central bankers ' types against the null .  The regression results 
are summarized in Table 5 .  Each political variable is defined so that the predicted sign on its 
coefficient is positive. 
Zero Independence and Partisans or Technocrats (H 1 ) .  To test the Nordhaus 
hypothesis, I form a pre-election dummy variable that takes on the value one for four quarters 
prior to each federal election and the value zero otherwise. The coefficient on this variable, 
"Pre-Election Period," has the right sign and is significant at the 5% level . The size of the 
coefficient reflects the substantive importance of electoral influences on Germany monetary 
policy. On average, monetary growth increases by . 566% in the four quarters preceding 
federal elections.  
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As a robustness check, I form an alternative pre-election variable, taking into account 
that two federal elections were called early because the incumbent federal government had lost 
its majority in the Bundestag. To the extent that the early elections came as a surprise to the 
government and the Bundesbank (admittedly a questionable assumption) , it is appropriate to 
set the pre-election dummy variable equal to one only for those quarters of the pre-election 
periods of the surprise elections that are part of the pre-election periods of the originally 
scheduled federal elections .  The regression results for this variable are similar but weaker: its 
coefficient has the right sign but is marginally insignificant at conventional levels ( 1 % and 
5%) .  
To  test the Hibbs hypothesis , I form a party code for the federal government (see 
Table 2 for details) . The coefficient on this variable, "Party Control of Federal Government," 
has the right sign but is insignificant at conventional levels .  This result appears to suggest that 
the one-half percentage point difference in monetary growth rates across Christian-Liberal and 
Social-Liberal governments observed in the raw data does not reflect party-specific monetary 
policy preferences, but other economic or political factors . However, the insignificant impact 
of party-political factors may be an artifact of effective controls for economic factors. In 
particular, the exchange rate regime dummy variables , both in their simple and multiplicative 
form, distinguish three periods of moderate, high, and low inflation that might otherwise be 
attributed to the party control of the federal government. It exceeds the scope of this paper to 
enquire into the possibility that exchange rate regimes are chosen endogeneously, depending 
on the party in power. 
Full Independence and Partisans (H2) .  To test Vaubel' s  obstructionist hypothesis, I 
create a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the median voter on the central bank 
council supports the federal government and the value minus one otherwise (see Table 2 for 
details) .  This variable is then multiplied with the pre-election dummy variable. The coefficient 
on the resulting multiplicative variable, "Pre-Election Period*Supportive Bundesbank 
Majority," has the right sign but is insignificant at conventional levels . 
Vaubel claims that his obstructionist hypothesis is consistent with the post-war data for 
a significantly large number of pre-election periods , but he does not test his hypothesis in a 
regression analysis. I attempt to replicate Vaubel ' s result in a regression analysis that controls 
for a variety of economic variables .  Since my partisan codes differ from Vaubel ' s ,  a failure to 
replicate his results could be due to coding differences.  My partisan codes rely on publicly 
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available information about the party composition of federal and Land governments who 
appointed the members of the Bundesbank Council . This coding procedure has the advantage 
of transparency and replicability. Vaubel, on the other hand, relies on the assessment of five 
anonymous "Bundesbank watchers" (three academics and two bankers) to code the party 
affiliation of the members of the Directorate. Since the partisan sympathies of individual 
members of the Directorate do not always reflect the party composition of the federal 
government that originally appointed them, Vaubel' s coding procedure has the potential to 
provide a more accurate picture of the party control of the Bundesbank Council . To ensure a 
fair test of the Vaubel hypothesis, I thus form an obstructionist dummy variable reflecting 
Vaubel' s  codes.  The resulting variable does indeed perform better than the variable that is 
based on my coding procedure (as measured by t statistics), but it is also insignificant at 
conventional levels. 
To test the median voter hypothesis , I assign to each member of the Bundesbank 
Council the party code of the federal or Land government that originally appointed him or her 
(see Table 2 for details) . For each period, I then calculate the median value of the party codes 
of the members of the council. The coefficient for this variable, "Median Voter on 
Bundesbank Council," has the right sign but is insignificant at conventional levels .  
The median voter model is based on the assumption that the monetary growth 
preferences of Bundesbank appointees reflect the preferences of the principals who originally 
appointed them. A plausible alternative assumption is that the members of the central bank 
council vote the preferences of their current political principals .  The latter assumption is 
appropriate if central bank appointees are concerned about reappointment. To investigate this 
alternative hypothesis, I form an alternative median voter variable based on the following 
coding procedure : for each quarter, the members of the council are coded according to the 
party affiliations of their current political principals in that quarter. It turns out that in the 1 960-
1 989 period the party control of the Bundesbank (as measured by this alternative median voter 
variable) coincides with the party control of the federal government. This result is not too 
surprising : between 1 960 and 1 989,  the council was composed of eleven Land Central Bank 
presidents and between six and nine members of the Directorate. In order to win majority 
control of the central bank (as measured by the alternative median voter variable) , the 
opposition party would have had to gain power in at least nine or ten (of eleven) Lander-­
which never occurred. 
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According to the alternative median voter variable, the federal government was always 
supported by a partisan majority on the Bundesbank Council . Using this result, the regression 
results for the Nordhaus and Hibbs hypotheses (H1 )  can be reinterpreted. The hypothesis that 
the degree of central bank independence is zero so that monetary growth rates are determined 
by the party control of the federal government is observationally equivalent to the hypothesis 
that monetary growth rates are set by the median voter on the Bundesbank Council , if the 
monetary policy preferences of central bank appointees are determined by their current political 
principals .  
This result also sheds some light on the original median voter model, according to 
which central bankers ' partisan sympathies are determined by the political principals who 
originally appointed them. The implications of the original median voter model, on the one 
hand, and those of the standard electoral and party politics models ,  on the other, differ 
primarily because of the eight-year terms of appointment enjoyed by Bundesbank appointees, 
which are routinely renewed and are staggered relative to the electoral terms of their political 
principals .  The party control of the Bundesbank (as measured by the original median voter 
variable) does not generally coincide with the party control of the federal government due to 
the lags implied by the length and staggeredness of Bundesbank terms of appointment. 
So far I have assumed that the decision-making process within the central bank council 
is adequately described by a median voter model. Given the importance of consensus in the 
rhetoric of central bankers , a plausible alternative hypothesis is given by a bargaining model 
according to which the monetary growth rate set by the central bank is an (equi-)weighted 
average of the monetary growth rates preferred by each member of the Bundesbank Council. 
As a robustness check, I replace the original median voter variable with the average party code 
across Bundesbank appointees .  The results for the median and average voter variables are 
very similar: the coefficient on the average voter variable has the right sign but is also 
insignificant at conventional levels. 
Partial Independence and Partisans (H3) .  To test whether the degree of central bank 
independence affects partisan monetary growth rates ,  I assume that the degree of 
independence decreases with the number of Bundesrat members who support the federal 
government. I utilize the Bundesrat measure of central bank independence because it is best 
motivated by the institutional analysis ; the empirical performance of other measures will be 
discussed further below. 
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I form a linear combination of the pre-election dummy variable, on the one hand, and 
the product of the pre-election dummy variable and the dummy variable reflecting central bank 
support for the federal government, on the other. The relative weight on the first variable, w ,  
is given by the proportion of Bundesrat members who support the federal government. The 
coefficient on the linear combination, "w*Pre-Election Period+( 1 -w )*Pre-Election 
Period*Supportive Bundesbank Majority," has the right sign and is significant at the 5% level . 
Similarly, I form a linear combination of the party codes for the federal government 
and the median voter on the central bank council , where the relative weight on the former is 
given by the proportion of Bundesrat members who support the federal government, as 
before. The coefficient on the linear combination, "w*Party Control of Federal 
Government+(J -w)*Median Voter on Central Bank Council ," has the right sign but is 
insignificant at conventional levels .  
Partial Independence and Technocrats (H4) .  To test whether the Bundesbank is 
controlled by partially independent technocrats, I multiply the pre-election dummy variable by 
the Bundesrat measure of central bank independence. The coefficient on this multiplicative 
variable, "Pre-Election Period*Size of Bundesrat Support," has the right sign and is 
significant at the 5% level . The size of the coefficient reflects the substantive significance of 
this hypothesis : if the party coalition controlling the federal government holds (say) thirty­
seven seats in the Bundesrat, monetary growth rates will be .484% [=(37- 1 5)x.022%] higher 
on average than if the government enjoyed the support of only fifteen Bundesrat delegates. 
The party code for the federal government is also multiplied by the Bundesrat measure 
of central bank independence. The coefficient on this multiplicative variable, "Party Control of 
Federal Government*Size of Bundesrat Support," has the right sign but is insignificant at 
conventional levels. 
Based on the F statistics reported in Table 5, I reject the null ("benevolent dictator") 
hypothesis H0 in favor of hypothesis H4, whose marginal explanatory power is significant at 
the 5 % level . (None of the other political hypotheses outperforms the null at conventional 
levels of significance.) I conclude that the Bundesbank is staffed with non-partisan technocrats 
who are partially insulated from political pressures.  Implicitly underlying this result is the 
auxiliary hypothesis that the Bundesbank' s independence decreases with partisan support for 
the federal government in the Bundesrat. 
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Maintaining the hypothesis that German monetary policy is set by partially independent 
technocrats, I now compare the empirical performance of the Bundesrat measure and other 
measures of central bank independence. 
The Bundesrat measure "Size of Bundesrat Support" implicitly attaches a greater 
weight to large Lander than to their smaller counterparts and zero weight to the city state of 
West Berlin (see Table 2 for details) .  In practice, the political leaders of small Lander can be 
very influential in forming the opinions of their parties .  For example, Willy Brandt and 
Helmut Schmidt were mayors of the city states of West Berlin and Hamburg, respectively, 
before they succeeded to the chancellorship; the leader of the small Saarland, Oscar 
Lafontaine, was the Social-Democratic candidate for the chancellorship in the 1 990 federal 
election. Thus,  a second measure, "Size of Lander Support," is specified as the number of 
Land governments that support the federal government, thereby assigning equal weights to the 
Lander. A third measure, "Supportive Bundesrat Majority," is binary, taking on the value one 
under unified party control of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and the value zero under 
divided party control. 
A fourth measure, "Popularity," captures the notion that the degree of central bank 
independence decreases with the popularity of the federal goverment and its economic 
policies .  It is equal to the percentage of public opinion poll respondents who express 
agreement with the economic policies of the chancellor. 
These four measures are highly correlated, and unsurprisingly so: if the federal 
government is unpopular, the parties forming the government coalition tend to lose votes in 
Land elections and consequently tend to lose control of Land governments and of Bundesrat 
seats . For this reason, the second, third, and fourth measures of central bank independence 
serve as a robustness check for the Bundesrat measure (though the empirical performance of 
the popularity measure is of independent interest) . 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
To deal with the multi-collinearity problem, I again employ a non-nested approach. 
The regression results are reported in Table 6 .  The coefficients on all political variables have 
the right sign. Consistent with my earlier results , the variables representing the electoral 
politics hypothesis are significant at the 5% levels ,  while the party-political variables are 
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insignificant at conventional levels .  The F statistics reported in Table 6 indicate that "Size of 
Bundesrat Support" performs best, followed by "Size of Lander Support," "Popularity," and 
"Supportive Bundesrat Majority." The hypotheses employing the first two measures 
outperform the null hypothesis at a 5 %  level of significance; the hypotheses utilizing the last 
two measures are marginally insignificant at conventional levels .  These results suggest that the 
measures are robust. It is not too surprising that the Bundesrat and Lander measures do better 
than does the binary measure of unified versus divided government; the former measures are 
better motivated by the institutional analysis and use the variability of the data to a greater 
extent. 
My hypothesis that popular governments have more influence over monetary policy 
than do unpopular governments is virtually the opposite of a proposition put forth by Frey and 
Schneider ( 1 98 1 ) .  The Frey and Schneider model implies that unpopular governments have 
incentives to manipulate monetary policy instruments to increase their chances of re-election, 
while popular governments do not. Frey and Schneider thus focus on government popularity 
as a factor influencing the government' s  desire to manipulate the economy for electoral gain, 
while I emphasize the government' s  ability to do so. 
In an attempt to replicate Frey and Schneider' s empirical results , I modify the pre­
election dummy variable employed earlier, setting this variable equal to one in pre-election 
periods only if the popularity of the chancellor' s  economic policies is below average, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient on this variable has the right sign but is insignificant at conventional 
levels .  In contrast, my regression results support my proposition about the negative 
implications of government popularity for central bank independence. However, I cannot 
exclude the possibility that the relatively weak empirical performance of my popularity 
measure is affected by the offsetting effects of government popularity identified by Frey and 
Schneider and myself. 
Based on my regression results , I draw the following conclusions : 
• The Bundesbank is not fully independent. 
• German monetary policy is subject to electoral pressures .  There is no evidence that 
partisan preferences are influential via the power of appointment. 
• The Bundesbank Council is staffed with partially independent technocrats whose 
independence decreases with the partisan support for the federal government in the Bundesrat. 
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These results are qualified as follows:  first, the insignificant impact of party-political 
effects may be due to the fact that they are easily confounded with a variety of economic 
factors driving German monetary growth, for which the regression analysis provides effective 
controls.  Second, because of the high degree of correlation between the institutional and 
popularity measures of central bank independence, it is reasonable to keep an open mind about 
the possibility that the Bundesrat veto does not matter. Instead, the institutional measures 
might capture the effect of government popularity on the government' s  capacity to influence 
monetary policy. Overall , however, the results are surprisingly strong--noting that the power 
of my statistical analysis is eroded by the necessity of having to control for a variety of 
economic factors and by the lack of publicly available data on voting behavior on the 
Bundesbank Council and of direct measures of government-central bank conflict. 
5 Discussion 
Based on the regression analysis, I conclude that the Bundesbank Council is staffed 
with non-partisan technocrats who are partially insulated from political pressures .  This result 
synthesizes the view that central bank appointees are depoliticized by Bundesbank-internal 
peer group pressures,  on the one hand, with the view that the Bundesbank is subject to 
external political pressures, on the other. Moreover, the auxiliary hypothesis that the 
Bundesrat veto protects the Bundesbank' s independence, at least to some degree, is the only 
hypothesis that is consistent with the evidence compiled in both the case study and the 
regression analysis. 
The recent debate on the institutional design of the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
renewed the scholarly interest in understanding the link between central banking institutions 
and monetary policy performance. By and large, the design of the ECB mimics that of the 
Bundesbank. It is empirically motivated by the celebrated monetary policy performance of its 
German counterpart rather than being shaped by theoretical considerations . The scholarly 
debate has mostly emphasized the importance of granting formal independence to the ECB to 
ensure that the Bank follows its mandated price stability goal . My analysis suggests that 
attention should be paid to the embeddedness of the ECB in the politics and institutions of 
European federalism that may affect its behavioral independence. 
Arguably, the federal systems of Germany and Europe are sufficiently similar so that 
we can generalize from the German experience to form expectations about the monetary policy 
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performance of the ECB . The link between federalism and central bank autonomy established 
in this paper may, however, fail to hold for societies whose politics and institutions differ in 
significant ways from those of the German polity . 
For example, in many developing countries ,  a considerable proportion of government 
spending is inflation-financed. Governments that face electoral or party-political pressures to 
provide public goods , subsidize state enterprises, and redistribute income may prefer a 
compliant, finance-providing central bank. In such settings, it is plausible that the number of 
veto players (or the strength of regional states in a federal system) is negatively correlated with 
central bank independence (Maxfield 1 994b) . Indeed, it is remarkable that in the highly 
industrialized world the most independent central banks are found in federal states :  Germany, 
Switzerland, the USA, and Canada; until recently federal states in the developing world have 
had some of the least independent central banks : Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico. A 
systematic comparative analysis of the relationship between federalism and central bank 
autonomy clearly remains an important topic for future research. 
In the end, my analysis suggests that legal independence is not a sufficient condition 
for a stable, low-inflation monetary policy. (Nor, for that matter, are the often-cited 
"inflationphobia" of the German people, the Bundesbank' s uncompromising anti-inflation 
ethos ,  or Germany' s  consensus- and norm-driven political culture.) The checks and balances 
built into the system of German federalism serve as a (partial) guarantor of the Bundesbank' s 
autonomy. My analysis has implications for developing countries that attempt to address their 
hyperinflation problems by setting up formally independent central banks . Such institutional 
solutions are unlikely to meet with success if the underlying politics and institutions that gave 
rise to hyperinflation in the first place remain unchanged. A formally independent central bank 
will be able to follow a sound monetary policy only if there exists a coalition of interests 
politically capable of protecting the integrity of the institution. 
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Table I 
Moneta ry Pol icy Outcomes as a Fun ction of the Degree of Central Bank I n depe ndence 








H 1 (Zero Independence & Partisans or Technocrats) 
• Monetary growth rates are higher prior to federal elections. 
• Monetary growth rates are lower (higher) if the federal government is controlled by a 
right-of-center (left-of-center) party. 
H3 (Partial Independence & Partisans) 
• Monetary growth rates are set as a linear 
combination of the partisan monetary growth 
rates desired by the federal government and 
by the median voter on the central bank 
counci l ,  where the re lative we ight on the 
monetary growth rate preferred by the federal 
government decreases with the degree of 
central bank independence . 
H2 (Full  Indepe ndence & Partisans) 
• Monetary growth rates are higher ( lower) 
prior to federal elections i f  the federal 
government i s  s upported (opposed )  by a 
part is an majority on the central bank council .  
• Monetary growth rates are lower (h igher) if  
the medi an voter on the central bank counci l  
was appointed by a right-of-center ( left-of­
ce n ter) party . 
H4 (Partial Independence & Technocrats) 
• Monetary growth rates are set as a linear 
combination of the partisan monetary grmvth 
rate desired by the federal government and 
the non-partisan monetary growth rate 
desired by central bank technocrats, where 
the rel ative weight on the monetary growth 
rate preferred by the federal government 
decreases with the degree of central bank 
independence . 
H0 (Fun Independence & Technocrats) 
Monetary growth rates are free of electoral or 
party-political effects. 
--- ---------
Ta ble 2 
Definition of · Variables 
.. Monetary Growth Rate, 
percentage growth rate of the seasonal ly adj usted central bank money stock in period 1 
• Growth Rate of Gross National Product, 
percentage growth rate of the gross national product in period t 
• Inflation Rate, 
percentage growth rate of the consumer price index in period t 
• Rate of Exchange Rate Depreciation, 
percentage rate of change of the U.S .  Dollar-Deutschmark exchange rate in period t 
• B reuon Woods, 
dummy variable taking on the value one for periods t= 1 9601 1 - 1 973/ l and the val ue zero for 
periods t= 1 973/2- 1 989/4 
• European Monetary System, 
dummy variable taking on the value zero for periods t= 1 960/ 1 - 1 979/ l and the value one for 
periods t= 1 979/2- 1 989/4 
• Pre-Election Period, 
dummy variable taking on the value one if period t is one of four quarters prior to a national 
election and the value zero otheiwise 
• Party Control of Federal Government, 
party code of  the party coalition supporting the federal government in period t; party codes are 
l isted below 
• Median Voter on B undesbank Counci l, 
median party code of the members of the Bundesbank Council in period t, where each member is 
assigned the party code of the federal or Land government that originally appointed him or her 
• S upportive B undesbank Majority, 
dummy variable taking on the value one in period t if sign { Median Voter on B undesbank Council , } 
= sign { Party Control of Federal Government, } and the value minus one otherwise 
" Size of B undesrat Support, 
n u m ber of Lander for wh ich .\·i1:n I Part y Con trol  of Land Govc m mc n l , ) = sign { Part y  (\m l ro l  ll f 
Federal G o vernment, ) ,  where each Land i s  weighted by the n u mbe r of i t s  seats i n  the B undcsrat . 
e xcepl for West Berl in ,  which i s  ass igned the weight zero; party codes and seat numbe rs are l isted 
below 
• Size of Lander S upport, 
n umber of Lander for which sign { Party Control of Land Government } = sign ( Party Control of 
Federal Government, } 
Ta ble 2 (Continued) 
Defi n i tion of Variables 
., Supportive B undesrat Majority, 
dummy variable taking on the value one if sign { Median Voter on B undesbank Counc i l, } = 
sign { Party Control of Federal Government, } 
• Populari ty, 
percentage of public opin ion poll respondents who express their support for the economic pol ic ies 


















· Due to the speci al status of Berlin in the post-war period, the representatives of West Berl in  i n  the 
B undesrat had very l imited voting rights , and they could only participate in an advisory capaci ty in  
matters of central banking.  For th is  reason, the Berlin delegates are assigned weight zero in the 
calculation of "Size of B undesrat S upport . "  
PARTY CONTROL OF FEDERAL OR LAND GOVERNMENT 
CDU/CS U or CDU or CSU 
CDU/CS U  or CDU or CSU 
i n  coal ition with FDP or other minor parties 
CDU/CSU or CDU or CSU 
in coal ition wi th SPD 
and in some cases minor parties 
S PD in coalition with FDP 
or other minor parties 
S PD 
SPD in coalition with GR 
or other "alternative" parties 
where 
CDU/CS U = Christian Union Parties 
CDU = Christian Democratic Union 
CS U = Chri sti an Social Un ion 
FDP = Free Democratic Party 
SPD = Social Democratic Party 












Descriptive Statistics of Variables, 1970/1 - 1 989/4 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN 
Economic Variables 
Monetary Growth Rate 7 . 5 3 2  7 . 65 5  
Growth Rate o f  Gross 2 .574 2 .9 1 5  
National Product 
Inflation Rate 3 . 894 3 .790 
R ate of Exchange Rate -2 . 889 -5 .785 
Depreciation 
Bretton Woods .442 0 
European Monetary System . 5 3 8  
Political Variables 
Pre-Election Period .263 0 
Party Control of Federal .275 1 
Government 
S upportive B undesbank - . 1 50 - 1  
Maj ority 
Median Voter on .488 1 
B undesbank Council 
S ize of B undesrat Support 20.538 20 
S ize of Lander Support 5 . 825 6 
S upportive B undesrat . 1 1 3 0 
Maj ority 
Popularity 42.59 1 42.625 
STD . DEV.  M AX .  M I N .  
2 .435 1 4  3 
2 .273 7 -5 
2 . 1 05 7 - .009 
1 2 . 394 37  -28  
.499 1 0 
. 502 0 
.443 1 0 
.968 1 - 1  
.995 - 1  
. 837  1 - 1  
4.455 27 1 5  
.938 7 4 
.3 1 8  1 0 
8 . 545 6 1  25 
Sou rces: T h e  econo m i c  data i s  contai ned i n  OECD, Main Economic Indicators, Paris 1 99 2 .  T h e  pop u l ar i t y  data 
i s  a v a i l a b l e  from the I ns t i tu t  fi.ir Demoskopic A l l e n s bach.  Al l  other  po l i t i c a l  variabl e s  were c o n s 1 ru c 1ed by 1he 
a u t h o r  based o n  ( i )  the dates of federal  a n d  Land e l e c t i o n s  and t h e  party c o n t ro l  o f  fed e ra l  a n d  Land 
g o v e rn m e n ts doc u m e n ted in  Zeitsch rift fiir Parlamet1tsfrage11 3/ 1 990, 470-4 7 2 ;  and ( i i )  the compos i t ion  of  the 
B u ndesban k Cou n c i l  documented by the B u ndesbank i n  i ts  monthly and annual  reports .  
Table 4 




Periods of Grand Coalition Government 
Periods of Christian-Liberal Government 




7.8 1 6  % 
8 . 1 87 % 
7.783 % 
7 .563 % 
8.08 1 % 
T11ble S 
Testing the Dei,trec of Central Bank I ndependence and Cenlral  B a nkers' Types 
Dependent Variable : Monetary Growth Rate, 1 960/ 1 - 1 989/4 
VARIABLES Ho 
Null Model 
Cons tant 4.64 1 • •  
( . 903 ) 
Monetary Growth Rate1. / .72 1 • •  
( .060) 
G rowth Rate of Gross - . 1 22 
N:i1 ional Producl ,. 1 ( .079 ) 
I nflation Rate1• / - .362"' 
( . 1 26)  
R ate of Exchange Rate 3 . 1 22 
Depreciation,. , (2 .337)  
B retton Woods - 3 .424 . . 
( .93 1 )  
Bretton Woocls•Growth .220· 
Rate of Gross National ( .095) 
Produc11. 1 
B retlon Woocls"'lnllation .625•• 
Ratc1 . /  ( . 1 ! 0 )  
B retton Woocls•Rate o f  -6.2 1 4  
Exchange Rate (5 .232)  
Depreciation1. J 
European Monetary System -2 . 063'  
( .886) 
European Monetary System - .095 
•Growth Rate of Gross ( ,  1 1 9) 
National Product,. 1 
European Monetary System . 200 
"'Inflation Rate,.; ( . 1 59) 
European Monetary System -5 .086 
• Rate of Exchange Rate (2 .700) 
Deprec iat ion,. 1 
Electoral Politics Model 
Pre-Election Period 
Pre-Elect ion Period• 
S u pportive Bundesbank 
M ajority 
w"' Pre- E lcc t ion Period 
+( l · wJ• Pre- Election 
Period• S upporti ve 
B undesbank Majority 
Pre-Election Period* 
S ize of B undesrat Support 
Party Politics Model 
Party Control of Federal 
Government 
Median Voter on 
B undesbank Counci l  
w"' Party Control o f  
Federal Government 
+(  / - w)• Median Voter on 
B undesbank Counc i l  
P art y  Control of Federal 
Govemment•Size of 
B undesrat Support 
Nu mber of Observations I 1 5  
R2 .833 
Adjusted R2 . 8 1 3  
Durbin h statistic - .280 
F(2 ,  I 02 )  stat ist ic 
Nous: S1andard errors i n  pi:ire n these s :  . . ,,,,, _ Q J ; . 
H Y POTHESES 
H ,  H2 
4.220· · 4 . s s s ·  
( . 9 1 8 ) ( 1 . 75 1 )  
.739 . .  .7 1 7 " "  
( .060) (060) 
-. l 36 - . 1 24 
( .078)  ( . 1 1 0) 
- .37 t • •  - . 366 
( . 1 23 )  ( . 2 29) 
1 . 593 2 . 330 
(2 .389) (3 .028) 
-2 .945°.  - 3 .43 1 
( .980) (2 . 233 )  
. 202· .203 
( .093) ( . 1 2 1 )  
. 592"'  .663° 
( .  I R2 )  ( . 2 7 2 )  
- 1 . 3 3 8  -7.248 
(5.87 1 )  (5 .72 1 )  
- 1 .362 - 1 .770 
( 1 .023) ( 1 . 3 J O) 
- .095 - . 1 20 
( . 1 1 7) ( . 1 4 1 )  
.047 . 1 47 
( . 1 83 )  ( .246) 
- 1 .679 -4 .202 




( . 249) 
. 1 48 
( . 1 73 )  
.003 
( . 5 23 ) 
---- - - - ---- - -
1 1 5 1 1 5 
.842 .835 
.820 . 8 1 2 
- 1 .26 J - .560 
2 . 890 . 7 38 
·-- -· ----
HJ H.s 
4 . 1 2 5 • •  4 . 3 56° · 
( 10 1 6 ) ( 89 1 )  
.73o· · . 7 3 7 " '  
( .060) ( .059 ) 
-. 1 23 - . 1 29 
(080) ( 077 ) 
- . 345°  - . 3 7 6 ' 0  
( . 1 3 1 )  ( . 1 2 3 )  
1 . 1 1 7 2 . 250 
( 2 .466) ( 2 . 3 1 8 ) 
-2 .946'0  - 3 . 068 ..  
( 1 .087) ( . 94 1 )  
. 1 84 . 1 8 5 
( .095) ( .093) 
.623••  .607 • •  
( . I 87) ( .  1 80 )  
-4 .280 - 2 .43 3  
(5 .578)  ( 5 . 7 3 2 )  
- 1 . 2 1 6 - 1 .570 
( 1 .089) ( .950) 
- . 1 29 - . 093 
( . 1 20) ( . 1 1 7 ) 
.028 .099 
( . 1 95 ) ( . 1 67 )  
- 1 .793 -2 .776 
(3 .042) ( 2 .789) 
.64 1 "  
( . 303)  
.022°  
( .009) 
. 1 50 
(235)  
.007 
( .007 ) 
- - - - -
- - ·  
l 1 5  ! ! 5  
. 84 1 . 843 
. 8 1 9  .R2 1 
- 1 . 1 9 1  - 1 . 387  
2 . 659 3 . 3 7 7 ' 
p = . 0 5 ;  IV =prnpo n i o n  nf R u ndesrnl  su pporl i n �  fcJ<r ; i l  
g o v c rn mc n l .  The F s l a l i !-> t i c as�esses  t he m a rg i na l  e x p l a n at o ry t:on t r i b u t i u n  of t he h y p o t h c , 1 "1  u n J � r  
consideration relative to the  n u l l  hypo1hesis. 
Taeble 6 
Testing Four Measures of Central Bank Independence 
Dependent Variable: Monetary Growth Rate, 1 960/ 1 - 1 989/4 
H YPOTHESES 
V A R I A B LES H4 H '  4 H "  4 H 
, , ,  
4 
Null Model 
Constant 4 . 3 5() . .  4 .33 2· · 4 . 652°· 4 . 2 n · ·  
( . 893) ( .900) ( . 89 3 ) ( .925 ) 
Monetary Growth Ra1e 1. 1 . 131··  .736 • •  . 7 1 9  . .  .733  . . 
( .059) ( .059) ( .060) ( .059) 
Growth Rate of Gross - . 1 29 - . 1 3 1  - . 1 22 - . 1 34 
National Product,. / ( .077) ( .077 ) ( .078) ( .078 )  
Inflation Rate1• 1 - .376 . .  - .374 . . - .362··  - . 367 " "  
( . 1 23 )  ( . 1 23 )  ( . 1 2 3 )  ( . 1 24 ) 
R ate of Exchange Rate 2.250 2 .0 1 0  3 . 1 24 1 . 5 5 8  
Deprec iation,. , ( 2 . 3 1 8) ( 2 . 3 37)  (2 . 298) (2 . 390) 
Bretton Woods -3 .068• •  -3 .049 . .  - 3 . 3 8 3  . .  -2 .994°0  
( .94 1 )  ( .954) ( .929) ( .996) 
Bret ton Woods •Growth . 1 85 . 1 88.  . 1 85 . 1 98 .  
R ate o f  Gross National ( .093) ( .093) ( .094) ( .093 )  
Product,. / 
Breuon Woods• !nflation .601 · ·  .60 1 . . .6 1 9• •  .592 ' "  
Rate,., ( . 1 80) ( . 1 80) ( . 1 8 1 )  ( . 1 83 )  
Brellon Woods*Rate of -2.433 -2 .487 -5 .687 - 1 .99 1 
Exchange Rate (5.732) (5 .73 8) (5 .737) (5 .859)  
Depreciation1.J 
European Monetary System - 1 . 570 - 1 .546 -2.065' - 1 .40 I 
( .950) ( .974) ( .872) ( 1 .032 ) 
European Monetary System -.093 - .097 - .095 -. 1 1 6  
•Growth Rate of Gross ( . 1 1 7) ( . 1 1 7) (. i 1 7) ( . 1 1 8) 
National Product1• 1 
European Monetary System .099 .094 .200 .057 
•Inflation Rate,. 1 ( . 1 67 )  ( . 1 7 1 ) ( . 1 57 ) ( . 1 84 )  
European M onetary System -2.776 -2 .470 - 5 .092 - 1 . 84 I 
'" R a te of Exchange Rate (2 .789) (2 .842) (2 .656) (2 .99 1 )  
Deprccia1ion,. 1 
Electoral Polilics Model 
Pre- Election Period *  .02 2 ·  
S ize of  B undcsrat Suppon ( .009) 
Pre-Election Period"' .083 · 
Size of Lander Suppon ( .034) 
Pre-Election Period •  .765 • 
Supportive Bundesra1 ( . 348) 
Majority 
Pre-Elec1ion Period* .0 1 2· 
Popularity ( .005) 
Pany Politics Model 
Party Control of Federal .007 
Govemment •Size of ( .007) 
Bundesrat S upport 
Party Control of Federal .02 1 
Govemment•Size of ( .027) 
Lander Support 
Party Control of Federal . 1 28 
Government• Supponive ( . 209) 
Bundesral Majority 
Party Control of Federal .002 
Govemment• Popularity ( .004) 
Number of Observations 1 1 5 l 1 5  I I 5 1 1 5 
R2 . 843 .843 .842 . 842 
Adjusted R2 .82 1 .82 1 . 8 1 9  .820 
Durbin h statistic - 1 . 3 87 - 1 . 387  - 1 . 1 2 1  - 1 . 248 
F(2, I 02)  stat istic 3 . 377 . . 3 . 242 2 .773 2 . 892 
Nous : S t andard errors in pare n t h eses ; . . p=.0 I ;  • p=.05.  The F s ta t i s t i<:  asse"es t h e  marg i na l  explana tory 
comribution of !he hypothesis under considerarion relat ive lo the n u l l  hypothesis .  
